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Introduction
During the late Victorian era, large volumes of capital were provided by individual investors to thousands of publicly-traded companies. 1 There has been an ongoing debate as to how the Victorians chose what securities to invest in, with a considerable amount of research into what encouraged British investors to export much of their capital overseas. 2 However, there has been little analysis as to what other characteristics of securities were important, and how these characteristics may have attracted different types of investors. 3 In this paper, we analyse what types of investors provided capital, how this changed over the nineteenth century, and whether there were clientele effects, in that companies with particular attributes attracted certain types of shareholders. For example, were businessmen more likely to invest in young industrial firms? Were rentiers attracted to foreign companies, or firms based in London? Were female investors more likely to avoid newly-formed firms and invest in safe dividend-paying domestic stocks? 1 On the growth of the equity market, see Michie, London Stock Exchange, Money, mania and markets and Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges on the formation and growth of Scottish and provincial stock exchanges in the nineteenth century. Acheson et al., 'Rule Britannia' show that there was a substantial rise in the number of common equities traded on the London market after this liberalisationbetween 1862 and 1866, the number of listed common equity securities increased by over 30 per cent. Secondly, we determine what influenced investor behaviour during this era. 6 We use company-and stock-specific data to explore whether there were clientele effects, with certain types of stocks and companies attracting different types of investors. There have been some suggestions in previous literature as to what may have appealed to particular investor groups.
Jefferys has argued that during the Victorian era, stocks which were marketable, had a low denomination, and no uncalled capital proved more attractive to the growing class of rentier investors. 7 Because the yield on consols had declined by an unprecedented c.30 per cent in the last four decades of the nineteenth century, rentiers were motivated by a "search for yield" to move some of their portfolio into high yield equities. Davis and Huttenback have suggested that the nobility and gentlemen were more inclined to invest in foreign and colonial securities, whilst businessmen favoured domestic enterprises. 8 Rutterford et al. have argued that female investors invested in preference shares over ordinary, possibly because they were regarded as safer. 9 From our analysis, we find that rentiers tended to invest heavily in large companies, and avoided firms which were family owned. They were willing to invest in foreign firms, and companies based and traded in London, but this was largely driven by the financial characteristics of the securities, rather than by any bias. In contrast, businessmen acted as venture capitalists, favouring young, domestic enterprises outside London. Women exhibited 6 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, , note that their study was constrained by data availability and they would have ideally measured the importance of each class of security to each group of holders by taking into account aspects such as dividend pay-out. 7 Jefferys, Business organisation, p. 209; Jefferys, 'The denomination'. 8 See Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire; Armstrong, 'The rise and fall of the company promoter ', and Cottrell, British overseas investment, p. 28. On the yield of foreign and colonial equities, see Grossman, 'Bloody foreigners'. a preference for safe investments which paid a dividend, and had a low yield. The middle classes also favoured relatively safe preference shares. Financiers focused on highly liquid, foreign securities, which they could easily trade and which may have offered higher returns, with institutional investors also concentrating on foreign firms.
These patterns of investment help us to understand not only the behaviour of investors, but also the growth of particular asset classes. For example, women and the middle classes were risk-averse. Companies who wanted to appeal to such clienteles could have issued low-risk securities, and this may help to explain the growth of preference shares and corporate bonds. 10 Such investors were also reluctant to invest directly in foreign companies, and the rise of investment trusts, which focused on overseas securities, may be explained by these risk-averse investors wanting professional help to choose international investments.
The analysis of clienteles also adds a new dimension to our understanding of what influenced managerial decisions during this era. Companies may have taken into account what their particular clientele of investors preferred, which may have affected dividend policy, and the decision on what types of securities to issue. This paper sits within a growing literature on shareholders in the Victorian era, which has at least five strands. The first strand has been concerned with the geography and background of shareholders in early railways and during the Railway Mania of the mid-1840s. 11 The second has focused on investors in banks across the nineteenth century. 12 Since many banks had unlimited liability and converted to limited liability, this literature has focussed on the wealth and suitability of shareholders. It has also focussed on the behaviour 10 Coyle and Turner, 'Great eversal'. 11 Broadbridge, 'Sources of railway share capital'; Campbell and Turner, 'Dispelling the myth'; Pollins, 'Finances'; Reed, 'Railways', Investment in Railways. 12 Anderson and Cottrell, 'Capital market'; Newton and Cottrell, 'Female investors'; Turner, 'Wider share ownership'; Acheson and Turner, 'Investor behaviour'. of bank investors, finding that investors exhibited a local bias, diversified when they should not have, and viewed bank stocks as consumption goods. 13 The third strand looks at the relationship between gender and investment. 14 This literature suggests that women were not as passive in this era as has been suggested and were willing to take the risks associated with equity investment. The fourth strand looks at who invested in foreign and colonial firms in the pre-1913 era, 15 whilst the final strand of the literature is socio-cultural in that it looks at novels and literary references to, as well as public perception of, investors. 16 In addition to its historical insights, this paper also contributes to the financial economics literature on clienteles of investors. In the modern era most investment is channelled through financial institutions, so it is difficult to observe the characteristics and preferences of individual investors. On the contrary, in our sample we can observe each investor, and determine more precisely their investment behaviour. This paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses our data sources and methodology. Section three examines the socio-occupational background of shareholders and analyses differences over time and across industrial sectors. Section four examines econometrically the determinants of investor clienteles in order to see the importance of investor home bias, risk, dividends, liquidity, share denomination, and uncalled capital for different groups of investors. Section five briefly summarises our findings. 13 Acheson and Turner, 'Investor behaviour'; Newton, ' The birth of joint-stock banking'. 14 Doe, ' Waiting for her ship to come in'; Green and Owens, 'Gentlewomanly capitalism'; Newton and Cottrell, 'Female investors'; Rutterford and Maltby, ' The nesting instinct' and 'The widow, the clergyman and the reckless'; Rutterford et al., 'Who comprised'. 15 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, . 16 Michie, Guilty money; Michie, 'Gamblers, fools, victims or wizards?'
Data and methodology
Companies registered under the 1856 and 1862 Companies Acts were required to lodge a yearly shareholder return with the Registrar of Companies. These returns were on a standardised form, Form E, which had columns for the shareholder's name, number of shares owned, shareholder address, and occupation. Records were kept for both ordinary and preference shares. The returns of companies which were dissolved before 1970 were placed within the Companies Registration Office files at the National Archives at Kew (BT31 series) and the National Archives of Scotland (BT2 series). Notably, bank and insurance companies set up before 1862 and statutory companies established prior to that date (e.g., railways and other public utilities) are not in our sample unless they registered under the 1862 Act.
Consequently our sample excludes the largest companies in this era, with none of our sample companies making it into the top 100 largest public companies in terms of market capitalisation.
We examined the collections of the BT2 and BT31 series for the 2,765 public companies which were quoted either in the Course of the Exchange before 1870 or in the Investor's Monthly Manual in 1870, 1885, and 1899. Numerous company files contained no ownership returns and most files had been extensively weeded to reduce their bulk. Thus, our strategy was to collect ownership returns for the 1850s, 1865, 1870, 1880, 1883, 1890, and 1900 or one year either side of these sample years if the return existed. If a company had ownership returns which fell outside the selected sample years, we collected a return for each decade between 1860 and 1900, where available.
After removing unintelligible returns and returns with missing pages, we inputted ownership returns for 488 companies and 890 company-years. Unfortunately, we found that the degree of occupational classification varied significantly. At one extreme, 49 of our company-years reported shareholders occupations 100 per cent of the time, but at the other end of the spectrum, we found 56 company-years which recorded shareholder occupations less than 20 per cent of the time. To create a robust sample of ownership characteristics, we focus only on those companies who had recorded shareholder occupational details 90 per cent of the time or more. We imposed this cut-off point because once one goes beyond it, it becomes questionable if companies were recording occupational details in a systematic and accurate manner. Indeed, of the 437 company-years excluded using this criterion, 47 per cent of shareholder occupation details, on average, were unreported.
The 10 per cent cut-off provided a sample of 293 companies, 453 company-years, 172,473 shareholders, and circa £95 million of share capital. 17 Within this sample, occupational details were missing for 3.9 per cent of individuals after the first phase of data entry. We therefore investigated each individual case using the original records to ascertain why characteristics had not been recorded. 18 This sweep improved the overall completeness of our occupational detail to 99.1 per cent. In terms of joint ownership of shares, where two or more individuals owned a share, we took the first named individual as the chief shareholder in the relationship and recorded their occupational status. The rationale for 17 Our sample is larger and much broader than that of Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, p. 196 because (a) our sample runs from the late 1850s up to 1902, whereas their sample runs from 1883 to 1907; (b) the focus of their sample is foreign and colonial companies, whereas our focus is much more balanced, with the result that we have many more domestic firms in our sample than they do; (c) their sample with 79,944 shareholders is less than half the size of ours; (d) unlike Davis and Huttenback, we have multiple observations for some companies. 18 We found information on 5,134 individuals who had been left uncategorised during the first stage of data entry. In 58 per cent of cases, we identified a male occupation which had been deemed illegible at phase one of data input. In another 15 per cent of cases, a title such as Major, M.P., Dr or Reverend was appended to the shareholder's name. A further 15 per cent were shareholdings held by an executor, trust, administrator or a company. The remaining 12 per cent of 'missing' shareholders were female and had not been classified as a spinster, widow or married woman in the original ownership files. adopting this approach is that Table A of the 1862 Companies Act assigned voting power to the first named owner when stock was jointly held. As joint ownership was relatively uncommon within our sample, this approach should not bias our findings towards a particular socio-occupational grouping.
There is an element of double counting in our sample of 172,473 shareholders. First, we have more than one observation for some companies. However, these are on average 15.9 years apart, which gives time for the shareholder constituency to change. Based on an analysis of the largest shareholders in each company, we found that about 50 per cent of them had disappeared by the time of the next ownership census. The second way in which we could have double counting is that an individual could be a shareholder in more than one company. However, a sub-sample of the 1,158 largest shareholders (i.e, some of the wealthiest shareholders) reveals that less than 1.5 per cent of them held a substantial stake in more than one of our sample companies, which suggests that we do not have much of a double-counting issue from this source.
As can be seen from Table 1 , our sample has a good spread of ownership censuses across the sample period -23 per cent from the 1850s and 60s, 14 per cent from 1870s, 29 per cent from 1880s, 24 per cent from 1890s, and 11 per cent from 1900 to 1902. It also has companies from across different industrial sectors, with 23 per cent from banking, 8 per cent from mining, 8 per cent from the insurance sector, 7 per cent from iron, coal and steel, 8 per cent from finance, 5 per cent from utilities, 4 per cent from breweries, and the remaining 38 per cent from a range of industries comprising docks, spinning and weaving, steamships, tea and coffee, telegraph, wagon, and miscellaneous industrial and commercial companies. We also have a good spread based on location of company headquarters, with 42 per cent from London, 10 per cent from Lancashire, and 7 per cent from Yorkshire. Notably, there is a similar distribution based on where the securities were traded, with just over half of our sample being listed on one of the provincial stock exchanges. Table 1 This study follows previous studies of share ownership in that we use the occupation reported in the ownership returns to assess the socio-occupational make-up of shareholder constituencies. There are, of course, limitations in doing so in that shareholders or company secretaries may overstate or misreport socio-occupational status. However, there would be little incentive for either party to do this in an era of limited liability.
<< Insert
Occupations were classified into broad categories Rentiers are subdivided into members of the nobility (as signified by titles), gentlemen and esquires. The terms 'gentleman' and 'esquire' occur frequently in the shareholder lists. In the pre-modern era, gentlemen and esquires were members of the landed gentry who made up the second tier of the aristocracy, with esquires being above gentlemen in the hierarchy. 19 However, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the term gentleman or esquire was applied more broadly. Nevertheless, the usage of the term gentleman or esquire in the Victorian era usually signified that one was unoccupied and usually indicated an education at an elite public school. 20 The 1891 Census gives some insights into these unoccupied males. In England and Wales, of approximately 7.5 million males over the age of 20 21 , there were about 450,000 unoccupied 22 . Of these, 192,611 were 'Retired from business', with a further 20,980 categorised as 'Pensioners', probably with a military, church or medical background. 96,593 were said to be 'Living on Own Means', although almost half of these were also over the age of 65. 23 Another 136,949 were listed as Other. This suggests that those categorised as Gentleman and Esquires in the shareholder lists were probably either retired, or from the upper classes and did not need to work, both of which would imply they were rentiers, receiving most of their income from investments.
Businessmen and financiers are considered separately. Businessmen are subdivided into three categories: manufacturers, merchants and retailers. The main way in which we differentiated between these three was as follows: manufacturers produce goods or industrial inputs, merchants are mainly wholesalers or intermediaries, and retailers are involved in the sale of goods to the general public (e.g., tailor, draper and butcher). Financial occupations are divided into bankers, stockbrokers and other finance (e.g., actuaries and accountants). Bank clerks and agents working for financial institutions were not included in these categorisations, but were part of the white-collar categorisation. Institutional investors are categorised as either companies, or investment trusts.
Women are subdivided so as to capture their need for income (widow and spinster) or whether they may have had more male input into their investment decisions (married 20 Best, Parliamentary Papers, 1893, 'Ages', p. 5 22 Parliamentary Papers, 1895, 'Occupations' 23 Parliamentary Papers, 1893, 'Ages', p.24 women). The middle class is split into: professionals (e.g., architects, doctors, dentists, engineers, senior managers etc.), white-collar occupations (e.g., bank clerks, teachers, administrators etc.), legal professionals and clergymen. The working class is subdivided into the skilled working class (e.g., joiners, painters, coopers, tanners, cabinet makers, cutlers, plumbers etc.) and unskilled working class (e.g., labourers and domestic servants etc.), although the former may in some cases be better classified as businessmen. We also examine some other groups separately, including politicians (mainly Members of Parliament) given their potential access to privileged information, those involved in agriculture who may have kept much of their capital in land, and members of the military who may have had a greater insight into foreign and colonial issues.
Who invested?
Table 2 contains the occupational composition of capital and shareholders in our sample. The first thing to note is that, unlike in the modern era, a very low proportion of capital is provided by companies or investment trusts. Investment trusts in the nineteenth century mainly invested in foreign and colonial debentures rather than in equity. 24 However, several investment trusts held sizable equity stakes in a small number of companies in our sample. In terms of the 107 shareholders who are companies, 42 are banks and six are insurance companies. Before it became illegal following the 1887 case of Trevor vs. Whitworth, some companies, mainly banks and insurance companies, held shares in their own company so as to make a market in them. 25 <<Insert Table 2>> 24 Rutterford, 'Learning from one another's mistakes'. We can see from Table 2 that 36.7 per cent of investors are rentiers and that they provide 44.8 per cent of capital. Thus, the archetypal rentier provides a substantial amount of capital for the new businesses which emerge in the second half of the nineteenth century.
This accords with the view that landowners and the gentry moved some of their assets into the stock market. 27 Notably, studies of bank shareholders, which typically rely on very accurate reporting of socio-occupational status because of the unlimited liability of the banks, reveal that the proportion of gentlemen and esquires in the shareholder constituency was as high as 30 per cent, which is not that far below the 38.6 per cent proportion reported in Table   2 . 28 Women constitute 20.3 per cent of investors and provide 10.9 per cent of capital.
Notably, the mean share capital per investor is a lot lower for women than other categories, which may simply reflect lower wealth or caution on the part of female investors. 29 As a point of comparison, Rutterford et al. find that for 1890-9, females constituted 25.3 per cent of the shareholdings and 10.8 per cent of the value in their national shareholding sample, which consists of larger and more prominent companies. 30 Thus, it appears that females were just as important in the financing of smaller and less prominent companies as they were in financing large, established firms. Notably, the proportion of widows, spinsters and married women in the 1890-9 Rutterford et al. national shareholding sample is similar to that in Table   2 . 31 In terms of our middle class groups, in total they constitute 14.5 per cent of shareholders and 11.0 per cent of capital. The proportion of investors who are white collar and professionals is on a par with studies of bank shareholders in this period. Perhaps one surprising finding is that there are a lot of clergymen investing in the stock of these companies. Clergymen, similar to women at the time, were believed to have small incomes and little experience of the financial world. 32 Notably, Table 2 reveals that the working classes were not well represented in the shareholding constituencies and provided only 0.5 per cent of capital. The mean amount of capital contributed by the two sub-groups of the working class is consistent with the intuition that these investors were the least wealthy of any other occupational groupings.
The final thing which we wish to highlight from Table 2 is that despite their small numbers, many politicians invested in our sample companies and provided 0.6 per cent of capital. After the nobility, politicians have the highest mean capital per investor of any sociooccupational group, perhaps indicating their wealth, but also the degree to which they invested in the equity capital of companies in the last half of the nineteenth century. Table 3 shows the proportion of capital contributed by socio-occupational status across each decade of the sample period. The first thing to note is that the percentage of 30 Rutterford et al., 'Who comprised', p. 169 . 31 Rutterford et al., 'Who comprised', p. 171 . 32 Rutterford and Maltby, 'The widow, the clergyman and the reckless', p.120. capital provided by businessmen (and merchants in particular) and financial professionals fell substantially as the century progressed. This fall could be explained by the fact that over time shares in these new limited companies were no longer perceived as being very risky and therefore they attracted more rentiers but fewer businessmen.
<<Insert Table 3>> Table 3 also reveals the growth in capital provided by rentiers over the second half of the nineteenth century. The proportion of capital provided by these investors rises from 35.3 per cent in the 1850s/60s to 44.1 per cent in the 1900s. Women only provided 2.9 per cent of capital in the 1850s/60s, but by the 1900s, they provide 19.7 per cent. Thus, the main finding which emerges from Table 3 is that rentiers and women become important as the century progresses, whilst businessmen and financiers become less important.
The proportion of capital provided by the middle and working classes changes little over the century, but it is only with the arrival of low-denomination shares in the 1880s that the unskilled working class begin to invest in equity. It is also worthy to note that participation of investment trusts in equity investment only really emerges in the 1890s and 1900s.
Since some of the findings in Table 3 may be driven by a cohort effect (i.e., the entry of new companies and industries), in Table 4 we look at the subset of companies where we have more than one ownership census to see if the changes over the century are due to new firms. As can be seen from Table 4 , there is a median of 15 years between ownership censuses. There are three changes which are worth commenting upon and which suggest that the findings of Table 3 are not being wholly driven by a cohort effect. First, there is a noticeable increase in the proportion of capital provided by women as well as in the number of women investors. Second, the increase in women investors and capital provided by women is counterbalanced by a fall in the number of and capital provided by businessmen.
Third, there is a slight increase in the number of and capital provided by the rentier classes.
Notably, the increase in the number of shareholders in the rentier classes is counterbalanced by a fall in the number of shareholders from the middle classes. Overall, these results suggest that the increase of women and fall in businessmen witnessed in Table 3 is not being driven by a cohort effect, whereas the growth in the rentier classes is partially.
<<Insert Table 4>> Table 5 shows the proportion of capital contributed by socio-occupational groups by industry classification, which was obtained from the Stock Exchange Yearbook and Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. A lot of the capital in mining companies, which were mainly foreign and colonial mines, was owned by gentlemen. This could be because investing in these mines was attractive to high net-worth, but yet inexperienced, rentiers who were willing to take significant risks in the hope of making large returns. 33 Businessmen contributed relatively little capital to mines and utilities compared to other sectors. Given that utilities were relatively safe investments, the low proportion of capital provided by businessmen may simply reflect their greater risk appetite. Women also avoided mines, but seemed to have preferred utilities and financials. Shares in these latter two sectors were relatively safe investments, which provided a steady dividend income, making them attractive to female rentiers. 34 <<Insert Table 5>> Table 5 also shows the capital invested by different occupational groups in foreign and domestic companies. Businessmen held a greater proportion of capital in domestic 33 Grossman, 'Bloody foreigners', pp. 485-6 finds that foreign mining companies produced high returns, but were very risky securities. 34 See Michie, Money, mania and markets, pp. 248-9 for a discussion on the speculative nature of mining stocks at this time and the security of stocks of utilities, banks and insurance companies. Grossman, 'Bloody foreigners', pp. 485-6 concurs with this view. companies than they did in foreign: 25.0 versus 10.6 per cent. 35 Gentlemen and esquires hold a greater proportion of capital in foreign companies versus domestic: 59.3 vs. 37.5 per cent. This is consistent with Davis and Huttenback's finding that the elite pursued a different investment strategy to other groups and with Cain and Hopkin's gentlemanly capitalists who placed their money overseas. 36 Women had a slightly greater proportion of capital in domestic companies, which could suggest risk aversion or local bias on the part of females. 37
Companies and investment trusts mainly invested in foreign companies, which is consistent with the focus of most investment trusts on foreign fixed-income securities. Those in the military also favoured foreign stocks, possibly reflecting experience of international conditions whilst based overseas. Overall, the picture which emerges is one of an investment dichotomygentlemen rentiers invested in foreign companies, whereas businessmen and women rentiers provided finance for indigenous companies.
In 48 company-years in our sample, firms had both preference and ordinary shares.
The proportions of capital invested by each socio-occupational group are in Table 6 . Given that preference shares paid a fixed rate of dividend and were perceived as being safer, it is unsurprising that women had a higher proportion of capital invested in them than in ordinary shares. This finding supports that of Rutterford et al. who find that female shareholders had a greater propensity to invest in preference rather than ordinary shares. 38 The reverse is the case for businessmen, which might indicate a greater risk appetite or less of a need for a fixed 35 Similar to Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, p. 200, we find that merchants were more likely to invest in foreign and colonial companies than other businessmen. 36 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, pp. 200-2; Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalists ', p. 3. income. Notably, rentiers from the rentier class had roughly the same proportion of capital in each type of equity security.
<<Insert Table 6>> In an attempt to see if certain occupational groups have a preference for the equities of companies headquartered and traded in London versus those which were headquartered and traded in the various regional markets, 39 we obtained information on the location of companies' headquarters from the Stock Exchange Yearbook and Stock Exchange Official
Intelligence. These two sources as well as the Investor's Monthly Manual were used to identify the stock markets where shares were chiefly dealt. As some of the companies in our sample were established prior to the publication of the first Stock Exchange Yearbook in 1875, we do not have this information for some companies in our sample.
The first thing to note from Table 7 is that shares in some companies were traded on London as well as on provincial stock exchanges. 40 We also see that gentlemen and esquires provided a smaller proportion of capital for regional companies than they did for Londonheadquartered companies. This finding is consistent with the fact that all foreign companies in our sample listed in London. However, gentlemanly capitalists still provided 27.2 per cent of capital to regional companies which listed only on provincial stock exchanges.
<<Insert Table 7>> Women provided a slightly greater proportion of capital to regional companies than they did to London-headquartered companies. Businessmen, particularly manufacturers, provided substantially smaller proportions of capital to London-headquartered compared to regional companies. Thus, these findings suggest something of another investment dichotomy 39 For the rise of the regional stock exchanges, see Killick and Thomas, 'Provincial stock exchanges'. 40 On this trend see Newton, The finance of manufacturing, p. 181.
-rentiers invested in London-based companies whereas businessmen provided finance for provincial companies.
Clientele effectshypotheses, empirical strategy and data
We now move on to test various hypotheses about whether certain types of individual had preferences for investing in certain types of shares. In particular, we consider company characteristics (i.e., firm size, firm age, board size and composition, foreign vs domestic firm, and provincial vs London firms) and share characteristics (i.e., marketability, dividends, risk, uncalled capital, and share denomination). We use six broad categories of shareholders: businessmen, rentiers, women, finance, the middle classes, and institutional investors (i.e., companies and investment trusts).
According to Jefferys, during the era covered in this paper, a group of middle-class investors or rentiers emerged who cared only about a stock's marketability, risk, and dividend. 41 We test this hypothesis by looking at whether middle-class and women investors tended to invest in companies which had marketable shares, were relatively safe, and paid a dividend. In particular, preference shares may have been attractive to these types of investors. 42 Jefferys also suggests that these investors were put off by high share denominations and uncalled capital. 43 Uncalled capital, whereby a portion of a share's nominal value was unpaid and could be called up at the discretion of firm managers, would have been unattractive to risk-averse investors such as women and the moderately-wealthy middle classes. 44 High share denominations were disliked by the same group of investors because they were perceived to be less marketable and made portfolio diversification more 41 Jefferys, Business organisation, p. 209 42 Jefferys, Business organisation, p. 220. 43 Jefferys, 'The denomination'. 44 See Acheson and Turner, 'Investor behaviour', difficult. Governance may have played a role in attracting certain types of investors, with larger boards and boards containing members of the nobility assuring inexperienced investors from the middle classes as to the quality of the company. 45 In order to test the above hypotheses, we regress company and share characteristics on to the proportion of capital invested by each of these six broad investor groups as well as the proportion of investors from each group. In terms of company characteristics, we examine whether (a) company age; (b) size; (c) being a family firm; (d) being a foreign firm; (e) size and composition of the board determine the proportion of capital invested by a shareholder group or the proportion of the shareholder constituency from a particular shareholder group.
In terms of share characteristics, we examine the following determinants: (a) whether a firm is a dividend payer or not; (b) a firm's dividend yield as a rough proxy for risk; (c) marketability of shares as proxied firstly by the number of times over the past year that there was a change in the end-of-month share price, which suggests that trading occurred, and secondly by the number of markets where shares were listed; (d) whether a share was a preference share; (e) the amount of uncalled capital attached to a share; and (f) a share's denomination as measured by its par value. The data sources for and definitions of these variables can be found in Appendix Table 1 .
We have four industry dummy variables in our regressions, and control variables for the year in which the ownership census was taken and the total number of shareholders in a firm. As the ownership records we use for our sample all come from companies which by definition ceased to exist, we control for any potential biases by having two variables which capture the ultimate fate of a firm -whether a firm merged (usually a non-performance reason for a firm's cessation) and whether a firm was wound up by a court (a performance reason for a firm's cessation). We also control for the location of a firm's head office by having three 45 Jefferys, Business organisation, pp. 353-4 binary variables for London, Lancashire, and Yorkshire, which are the most common locations for headquarters. In addition, we have a control variable which is the distance between the company's headquarters and the chief market where its shares are dealt. This variable acts as a proxy for whether a company is a local firm with shareholders located in the area. The data sources for and definitions of all of these variables can be found in Appendix Table 1 .
As some firms had both preference and ordinary shares, we consider each share class as a separate observation in our regression analysis. In other words, a preference share and an ordinary share from the same company enter our regressions individually. Table 8 contains the summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables. In terms of our key independent variables, we note the following. First, the mean company age (Age) is 17.58 years and total par value (Size) is £232,600. Second, 29 per cent of the equities in the sample are those of foreign firms, whereas 18 per cent are those of family firms. Third, 84 per cent of equities pay a dividend (DivPayer) and the median dividend yield (DivYield) is 5.71 per cent is high. Fourth, the median of our Liquidity variable is 0.42, which means that the end-ofmonth share price for the median equity changed 42 per cent of the months over the previous
year, suggesting that many of our equities were illiquid. This is further evidenced by the fact that the median of our NumMarkets variable is one, which means that the median equity in our sample only traded on one stock market. Fifth, in terms of share denomination (ShareParValue) the mean is £10.76 and in terms of uncalled capital (ShareUncalled) the average is £13.69. Sixth, as indicated by the statistics for the Preference variable, nine per cent of the equities in the sample are preference shares. Seventh, the average number of directors in a firm was 6.13, and 36 per cent of firms had at least one director who was a member of the nobility.
<<Insert Table 8>> 
Clientele effectsresults
We can see from Table 8 that there are a smaller number of observations for our dividend and liquidity variables. Consequently, we run two regression specificationsone for the complete sample from which these variables are excluded and one for the subset of equities where we have this data. The regression results for the rentiers, women and the middle classes are in Table 9 , with the results for businessmen, institutions and financiers in Table   10 . In both these tables, the proportions of capital contributed by each of the sociooccupational groups are the dependent variables.
<<Insert Tables 9 and 10>> We find that rentiers preferred to invest in large firms, and avoided family firms, suggesting that they were not major providers of capital for small, regional enterprises. There is some suggestion of a greater tendency to invest in foreign securities, but this does not remain significant when controlling for the financial characteristics of the assets. This adds some context to the debate on why so much capital was exported abroad. It was not necessarily a preference for foreign securities, it was just the underlying characteristics of the assets. For example, they invested more in mines, many of which were based abroad.
Women took a different approach to investing, showing a strong pattern of riskaversion. They focused on older, established companies, which were dividend payers. The investments tended to have a lower dividend yield, again reflecting lower risk, and there was a greater propensity to invest in preference shares. They also avoided companies with high amounts of uncalled capital, limiting their exposure to future calls on capital. They may have been more reluctant to invest in foreign firms, but again the significance disappears when controlling for the financial characteristics of the assets. The marketability of shares does not seem to have been a consideration for women, possibly because they were the stereotypical buy-and-hold investors and thus cared less about stock liquidity. 46 Therefore, the Jefferys hypothesis that such investors preferred fully-paid and marketable stocks is not fully supported in that although women investors preferred fully-paid shares, they had no preferences with regards to stock marketability. 47 The middle classes also had a tendency to invest in preference shares, and avoided foreign firms and mines. They also avoided family firms, and focused more on businesses which had more directors, possibly regarding them as having better governance. Perhaps surprisingly, they also tended to invest in smaller companies. In addition, there is no support for Jeffery's contention that women and middle class investors preferred low denomination stocks.
Businessmen acted as the venture capitalists of the era. They invested in young, domestic, family firms, in some cases probably being the founders themselves. They avoided companies with nobility on the board of directors, possibly reflecting their scepticism about how much value they would add to the company.
Financial professionals may be regarded as the speculators of the period. They invested in highly liquid stocks, which they could buy and sell quickly. They invested more in foreign firms, and avoided preference shares, reflecting a greater willingness to embrace risk in the hope of making higher returns.
Institutions also tended to focus on foreign companies, reflecting the initial concentration of investment trusts on foreign and colonial investments 48 . This focus may have been a deliberate marketing technique. As noted already, women, the middle classes and businessmen were reluctant to invest directly in foreign companies. They may have found 46 Barber and Odean, 'Boys will be boys' find that in the 1990s men trade shares 45 per cent more than women. 47 Jefferys, Business organisation, p. 209; Jefferys, 'The denomination'. 48 Chambers and Esteves, 'First global' using an investment trust to be appealing, as they may have believed the trust managers could have used professional expertise to pick the best international investments.
Thus far, we have been looking at the determinants of the proportion of capital invested by various socio-occupational groups. In Table 11 , the dependent variables are the portion of investors in each socio-occupational grouping. Most of the results in Table 11 are consistent with what we found when the proportion of capital invested by various sociooccupational groups were the dependent variables. This is not necessarily surprising given that, apart from institutional investors, there is a close correlation between the number of investors and the proportion invested (see Table 2 ). However, there are a few notable differences. There are significant and positive coefficients suggesting that rentiers were indeed more likely to invest in foreign and London-based firms. Also, if a firm was a dividend payer, fewer from the middle class invested in it.
<<Insert Table 11>> The overall picture which emerges from our regression analysis is as follows. The rentier classes exhibited a preference for large firms. Women investors tended to focus more on assets which were relatively safethey shunned young and non-dividend-paying firms as well as mining companies, shares with uncalled capital, and shares with a high dividend yield. The middle classes had a proclivity for preference shares and domestic firms.
Businessmen focused on young, domestic, family firms, suggesting that they invested in what they knew and in what they had information on through their business networks. In contrast, financiers and institutional investors favoured foreign securities.
Conclusions
This paper has considered who invested in equities during the substantial expansion of the British equity market in the five decades following the liberalisation of incorporation law in the mid-1850s. We find that rentiers were the largest providers of capital, with businessmen, women and the middle classes also investing substantial amounts. Businessmen became less important over time, whilst women contributed greater proportions.
There were significant differences in investment styles between the groups. Rentiers focused on large firms, whereas businessmen invested primarily in young, regional, family firms. Women and the middle classes tended towards low-risk investments, whereas financiers sought highly liquid stocks which they could trade quickly, and investment trusts were more attracted to foreign investments.
These results raise issues about whether managers of firms understood their shareholder clienteles, and pursued particular policies as a result. For example, did they maintain their dividend policies to placate those shareholders who wanted a steady income?
Did they issue preference shares or bonds in order to appeal to risk-averse investors, and can this explain the growth in these asset classes over time? Similarly did the investment trust industry gain popularity because it opened up international investment to clienteles who had traditionally avoided investing directly in foreign stocks? Future research on the growth of these asset classes may reveal interesting connections between ownership, governance, and financial innovation.
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